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The arguments 
of attorneys Seth 
Waxman (left), 
David Ogden, and 
Danielle Spinelli in 
Roper v. Simmons 
helped convince the 
Supreme Court that 
it is unconstitutional 
to execute juvenile 
offenders who were 
under the age of 18 
when their crimes 
were committed. 
JAY MALLIN 
''Aposter child for us"-
that's what Seth Wax-
man, the lawyer urging 
The most heinous killers, 
although not yet 18 when they 
murdered, may still deserve to die. 
the key fifth vote and wrote the 
majority opinion. "Progres-
sives" have hailed this opinion 
the U.S. Supreme Court to outlaw the 'juvenile" death 
penalty, called Mark Anthony Duke. Four justices-
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens, 
and David Souter-had already publicly declared the juve-
nile death penalty "shameful," while Justices Antonin 
Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and William Rehnquist could be 
counted on to support a state's right to decide on a case-by-
case basis. Anthony Kennedy's vote would be key. "Chilling 
reading," Justice Kennedy observed, pointing to Alabama's 
amicus brief cataloguing young killers it had condemned to 
die. "Look at those examples, the very first one," Waxman 
shot back, focusing on Mark Anthony Duke. "This is a kid 
who went on a killing spree." His behavior demonstrated 
"transient aspects of youth" rather than "a stable, enduring 
character." Thus, the Constitution forbade his execution, 
and, concluded the abolitionist lawyer replying to Justice 
Kennedy during oral argument, Mark Anthony Duke was "a 
poster child for us." 
This characterization may well have had its impact: On 
March 1, 2005, in Roper vs. Simmons (543 U.S. 551), the 
United States Supreme Court, 5-4, made headlines, cate-
gorically striking down the death penalty for 16- or 17-
year-olds as unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy supplied 
as a triumph for human dignity and decency, a step in the 
right direction that only enhances the administration of 
justice. How could any humane person-even those of us 
who generally support the death penalty for the most 
egregious criminals-disagree that kids who kill on the 
spur of the moment can't possibly be among those who 
deserve to die? 
But some of us don't see it quite that way. We insist that 
far from refining and improving the administration of 
justice, this watershed decision, fundamentally flawed 
and flatly wrong in spots, seriously undermines a system 
of justice devoted to ensuring that the "worst of the 
worst" do get their just deserts. 
Now that Mark Anthony Duke has been spared the 
death penalty and transferred to general population, the 
world at large may forget this "poster child's" "transient" 
behavior on March 22, 1997, and the response it war-
rants. But we cannot ... 
The Duke and Simmons cases 
Generally annoyed at his father who was "always on my case 
about something," but especially angry when his father 
refused to lend him the family truck, Duke, 16, enlisted his 
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older friend to help kill his father. But 
Dedra Hunt, his father's live-in girl-
friend, and her two young children, 
ages 6 and 7, would also be at home. 
No matter. According to Duke's plan, 
his friend Brandon would kill Dedra. 
Duke would take care of the rest. 
Armed with a .45 he had carefully 
wiped clean, Mark Anthony Duke 
brought his friend Brandon Samra, 
19, to his house. In the kitchen, 
Duke told his father he was tired of 
being bossed around and shot him 
to death. Meanwhile, Dedra and her 
children were on the couch by the 
fireplace, watching television. Samra 
shot Dedra in her face. Bleeding, 
Dedra fled upstairs with her little 
girls, Samra chasing after her, shoot-
ing but missing. Dedra locked her-
self in the bathroom with her 
six-year-old. Samra, out of bullets, 
couldn't pry the door open, but 
Duke kicked it down, and, as Dedra 
begged for her life, he shot her in 
the forehead, killing her instantly. 
Sixteen-year-old Duke then found 
six-year-old Chelisa cowering in the 
shower. "It will only hurt for a 
minute," Duke assured her as he slit 
the child's throat with a kitchen 
knife. Then Duke searched and 
found seven-year-old Chelsea, hid-
ing, terrified, under her bed. While 
she struggled he slashed her face 
and hands 15 times, but he could not 
slit her throat. So Duke ordered 
Samra who first refused, but, afraid 
of Duke, slit the child's throat as 
Duke held her down. 
Now Duke began an elaborate, cal-
culated, cover-up. He carefully 
cleaned up the house, then took his 
friends to see the movie "Scream," 
ordering them to keep the ticket stubs 
as proof of an alibi. Then they had 
dinner and shot pool. Overnight, 
Duke must have had second thoughts, 
because the next day, he brought his 
friends back to the home, and ran-
sacked it to make it look like robbery. 
Then Duke dialed 911: He had just 
discovered his family murdered. 
When the police arrived, an appar-
ently frightened Duke gratefully 
accepted protective custody. 
According to the state medical 
examiner, six-year-old Chelisa suf-
fer.ed two 5 1/ 4 inch lacerations 
across her throat at Duke's hands. 
Like her older sister, before she died, 
the child aspirated her own blood 
for several minutes. It hadn't "only 
hurt for a minute." 
An Alabama jury sentenced Mark 
Anthony Duke to die. 
Seth Waxman, however, wasn't 
representing this poster child. His 
client, Christopher Simmons, at 17 
also the leader of his pack, convinced 
younger friends they'd "get away with 
it" because they were minors. In the 
middle of the night, Simmons broke 
into a house he had picked at ran-
dom, dragged Shirley Crook from 
her bed, duct-taped her eyes and 
mouth, bound her hands, and drove 
her minivan to a state park. They 
walked the terrified victim to a rail-
road trestle, tied her hands and feet 
together with electrical wire, 
wrapped her entire face in duct tape 
and threw her from the bridge to 
drown in the Meramec River. Later, 
Simmons bragged about the killing, 
telling friends he had killed a woman 
"because the bitch seen my face." A 
jury in Missouri had sentenced Sim-
mons to die, and now, years later, the 
Court was deciding whether states 
with the death penalty could ever 
constitutionally condemn 16- or 17-
year-olds. 
Using highly questionable meas-
ures, as Justice Scalia acidly pointed 
out in dissent, the Court found 
American "standards of decency" 
had "evolved" into a national consen-
sus against the juvenile death 
penalty. History will show that this 
"consensus" is at best speculative and 
probably false. Can anyone honestly 
insist that once exposed to the grisly 
details of Mark Anthony Duke's mul-
tiple murders-carefully planned 
and covered up, leaving a little girl, 
lying on the floor next to her Legos, 
her throat slit, to bleed to death-a 
majority of Americans would vote to 
let him live out his life in general 
population? 
Drawing the line 
Why draw a constitutional bright line 
at 18? True, as the majority pointed 
out, "almost every State prohibits 
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those under 18 from voting, serving 
on juries, or marrying without 
parental consent." But most states 
allow 16- and 17-year-olds to drive 
cars-relying on their mature judg-
ment and split-second decision mak-
ing to operate high-speed, multi-ton 
death machines among the public. 
Many states also set 16 as the age at 
which a woman may consent to have 
an abortion-to terminate a poten-
tial human life. And many states, 
such as New York, set 13-yes 13-as 
the age of full criminal responsibility 
for non-capital murder. 
An extraordinary 13-year-old can 
get life in prison, 14-year-olds may be 
tried and convicted as adults for 
many other serious felonies, and 16-
year-olds are punishable as adults for 
all crimes. Of course, prosecutors 
and judges may channel young crim-
inals into a juvenile system, based 
upon an individual case-by-case 
analysis. Why, then, not do it case-by-
case with the death penalty? Cer-
tainly the community has judged 
that 16-year-olds can be fully respon-
sible for their own choices. 
When a 16-year-old bravely runs 
into a house ablaze, risking his life to 
save two young children, we justifi-
ably celebrate and reward this hero-
ism. We do not-nor should 
we-dismiss this goodness and brav-
ery as a product of a not-yet fully 
formed personality. We see this 
heroic act as clearly manifesting 
great and good character. If we can 
fully celebrate the heroism of our 
best youth, why can we not fully con-
demn cowardly and vicious selfish-
ness of our worst? 
Of course adolescents may be par-
ticularly susceptible to peer influ-
ence, while feeling invulnerable 
toward risks of punishment, and par-
ticularly unconcerned with the 
future punitive consequences attach-
ing to their present homicidal behav-
ior. Adolescent behavior may be 
impulsive. Youth ordinarily does 
diminish culpability. The majority of 
the Court does reflect the majority of 
the People, insisting that "retribu-
tion is not proportional if the law's 
most severe penalty is imposed on 
one whose culpability or blamewor-
thiness is diminished, to a substantial 
degree, by reason of youth and imma-
turity" (emphasis added). 
True, Mark Anthony Duke, 16, 
their "poster child," was the younger 
of the killing duo. But he was the 
source not the subject of peer pres-
sure. He initiated, planned, exe-
cuted, and carefully covered up the 
mass murder. He coerced the dim-
witted 19-year-old Brandon Samra to 
go along with it. Nor was Christo-
pher Simmons subject to outside 
pressure, acting in the fury of the 
moment. He played the adult role, 
planning the random burglary/mur-
der and assuring his younger friends 
they could "get away with it" because 
they were underage. 
Almost never is not never 
During closing argument, the prose-
cutor had improperly suggested that 
the jury treat Simmons's youth as an 
aggravating circumstance. Being 
young may make a killer more dan-
gerous and less deterrable. But for us 
retributivists, we who believe that 
punishment should be proportional 
to past culpability, youth cannot 
make a person more deserving to die. 
If the Court was determined to 
reverse Simmons's death sentence, 
and make a categorical pronounce-
ment, it could have held that a defen-
dant's youth may never be treated as 
an aggravating circumstance. A very 
strong presumption of life should 
attach to juvenile killers. We should 
almost never execute a person for 
what he or she did at 16 or 17. 
But almost never is not never. 
Constitutionally, jurisprudentially, 
and morally, capital crimes should be 
defined narrowly, to include only the 
worst of the worst. Current death 
penalty statutes commonly violate this 
ideal: Absent additional aggravating 
circumstances, robbery-felony-mur-
der-that most typical teenage, 
impulsive murder committed by one 
pushed or pulled by peers-should 
1. 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003). 
2. Id. at 1012 (emphasis added). 
3. Id. at 1012 (emphasis added). 
4. Id. at 1013 (emphasis added). 
5. Id. at 1013 (emphasis added). 
6. Id. at 1013 (emphasis added). 
not make killers-juvenile or adult-
death eligible. The "drug related" 
aggravator, too, should be dropped 
along with robbery. But once an indi-
vidual, whether 16 or 26, apparently 
falls within that class of especially 
vicious killers, we should consider 
that person's case and character con-
cretely and individually. Fairness 
requires no less. 
If a 17-year-old, acting alone, with-
out peer pressure, kidnaps a 7-year-
old, rapes and tortures her, and 
throws her off a bridge or buries her 
alive, or bludgeons her to death after 
she pleads for her life and tosses her 
in a trash bin, then peer group pres-
sure is irrelevant. So too are the cal-
lous killer's short time horizon and 
general risk-proneness. That these 
sadists or psychopaths do not con-
sider their own future punishment 
or their own personal mortality while 
torturing their helpless victims is 
morally irrelevant. They are the 
worst of the worst and deserve to die. 
We can, we should-morally, we 
must-decide this, case by case. 
The "scientific" evidence 
But the Supreme Court majority was 
categorical, four times citing and 
quoting from Laurence Steinberg 
and Elizabeth Scott's brief essay Less 
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Develop-
mental Immaturity, Diminished Respon-
sibility, and the juvenile Death Penalty. 1 
Steinberg and Scott, to be sure, cate-
gorically oppose a 'juvenile' death 
penalty. The scientific bases for their 
personal policy preference, however, 
are just the opposite-tentative, non-
categorical, and matters of degree. 
Several statements from their essay, 
which the majority fails to acknowl-
edge, show this: "In our view it is an 
open and unstudied question whether, 
under real-world conditions the deci-
sion making of mid-adolescents is 
truly comparable with that of adults."2 
"[A]lthough more research is needed, the 
widely held stereotype that adoles-
cents are more impulsive than adults 
finds some support in research"3 
"Taken together, these findings indi-
cate that adolescents may have more 
difficulty regulating their moods, 
impulses, and behaviors than do 
adults"4 So, even the abolitionists' 
experts concede that "more research 
is needed" to conclusively prove or 
disprove that which merely finds 
"some support" and only "may" be 
true. Yet, they and the Court majority 
simply outlaw the penalty wholesale. 
Abolitionists claim that scientific 
research shows teenagers have not 
fully developed brains. We retribu-
tivists, who would execute sadists for 
torture murders committed when 
they were 16 or 17, should find it 
unsettling if evidence did demon-
strate a not-fully developed brain 
structure as the cause of the killing. 
But again, even Steinberg and Scott 
concede the evidence is far from cat-
egorical: "At this point, the connection 
between neurobiological and psychologi-
cal evidence of age differences in 
decision-making capacity is indirect 
and suggestive. "5 "rn uveniles may have 
diminished decision-making capacity 
compared with adults because of dif-
ferences in psychosocial capacities 
[that] are likely biological in origin."6 
The much larger and deeper . 
debate between free will and deter-
mm1sm underlies all criminal 
responsibility. But search the litera-
ture the Court cites; no connection 
between organic brain development 
and moral responsibility has been 
explicated, much less demonstrated. 
As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
declared in dissent, "the Court 
adduces no evidence whatsoever in 
support of its sweeping conclusion." 
We who are committed to execut-
ing the worst of the worst-those, 
but only those who deserve to die-
insist on a case-by-case examination. 
Only if, after a detailed study of the 
individual, we can conclude not only 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
or she did it, but also to a moral cer-
tainty that this is the very uncommon 
young adult who deserves it, we may 
and we should condemn him to die. 
This case-by-case approach is not 
only moral, it more naturally flows 
from the very research and findings 
the majority embraces. 
What really counts? 
The Supreme Court's decision in 
Roper v. Simmons made front-page 
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headlines that day and has continued 
to reverberate politically, even mov-
ing justices to make a rare public 
defense, and Chief Justice John 
Roberts to make a rare criticism of 
recent case law in his confirmation 
hearings. 
The majority of five and Justice 
O'Connor's separate dissent together 
insist that although the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition of grossly 
disproportionate punishment does 
depend on "evolving standards of 
decency," an American consensus can 
be bolstered by an international con-
sensus to indicate those evolving stan-
dards. "The basic premise of the 
Court's argument-that American law 
should conform to the laws of the rest 
of the world-ought to be rejected 
out of hand," protested Justice Scalia. 
"I do not believe that the meaning of 
our Eighth Amendment ... should be 
determined by the subjective views of 
five Members of this Court and like-
minded foreigners." But, as the major-
ity had declared repeatedly, this world 
consensus was not constitutionally 
"controlling." Over and over, the 
majority declared it as their own 
"independent judgment" that death is 
an unconstitutionally "disproportion-
ate" response to murder committed 
by a 16 or 17-year-old. 
Although they never explicitly 
acknowledged it, the majority plus 
O'Connor must hold that "gross dis-
proportionality" and "evolving stan-
dards of decency" are real, 
objectively discernable facts, inde-
pendent of individual justices' per-
sonal tastes and preferences. 
Retributivist advocates of the death 
penalty, although vigorously oppos-
ing the result in Roper v. Simmons, 
may nonetheless embrace the major-
ity plus O'Connor's underlying 
ontology: There are moral facts. Some 
16- and 17-year-olds deserve to die. 
Regardless of public opinion, Mark 
Anthony Duke's death sentence was 
not per se disproportionate. Ulti-
mately we know this fact-that he 
deserves to die-intuitively, with a 
moral faculty that requires an emo-
tional connection to the victim, 
attention to the defendant's charac-
ter and how it was (de)formed, and 
the motives, harm, nature, and cir-
cumstances of the crime. 
Thus here the Roper majority, and 
O'Connor in dissent, are correct: 
Public opinion, including interna-
tional public opinion, does help 
guide us to the moral fact of the mat-
ter. But if an overwhelming majority 
of the American public today sup-
ported the death penalty for blas-
phemy, or petty larceny, or drug 
dealing, their anger might be under-
standable, but the punishment they 
urged would in moral fact be dispro-
portionate and unconstitutional. 
More importantly, however, "the 
overwhelming weight of interna-
tional opinion against the juvenile 
death penalty" is probably non-exis-
tent, and definitely not demon-
strated. Every Supreme Court justice 
in Roper missed the crucial distinc-
tion between international law and 
international public opmron-
between governmental elites and the 
people they supposedly represent. 
The Supreme Court majority simply 
equates the "practices of other 
nations" with "the views of the inter-
national community." It cites treaties 
between governments, and parlia-
mentary laws-the products of gov-
ernmental elites-and then simply 
morphs them into "the overwhelm-
ing weight of international public 
opinion" or "the opinion of the 
world community," when they are no 
such thing. Justice O'Connor, too, 
conflates "foreign and international 
law" with "the views of other coun-
tries" and converts them into "the 
overwhelming weight of interna-
tional opinion." Even Justice Scalia 
equates "the laws of the rest of the 
world" with "the views of other coun-
tries and the so-called international 
community" (emphasis added). 
Once exposed, the fallacy 
becomes obvious. When abolitionists 
point to America's "moral isolation" 
as the "only democracy" with a death 
penalty, they must ignore recent sur-
veys that show that 81 percent of the 
Japanese support the death penalty.7 
Thus America becomes the "only 
Western democracy with the death 
penalty." But here, too, the facts are 
embarrassing. Every European gov-
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ernment and Canada abolished the 
death penalty, but always in the teeth 
of overwhelming public support for 
its continuation. Even today, decades 
later, rejecting repeated attempts by 
the elites-teachers, media, and gov-
ernmental officials-to shame them, 
a majority of Canadians, over two-
thirds of the British, and probably a 
majority of the People in almost 
every European nation continues to 
support capital punishment.8 
Recently Poland's Parliament nar-
rowly rejected reinstating the death 
penalty in a 198-195 vote, although 
opinion polls showed 77 percent of 
the Poles support its return. 9 
Real-world cases 
Let us present fully and fairly to the 
People of Europe, or Asia, or Africa, 
or South America the facts of real-
world cases-and not a simple dis-
torting question in the abstract such 
as 'Do you support executing juve-
niles?' Ask the world community 
about Kenneth Loggins and Trace 
Duncan, whom Alabama has con-
demned. Both 17, Loggins and Dun-
can picked up hitchhiker Vickie 
Deblieux, traveling to her mother's 
home in Louisiana. They took her to 
a secluded spot and, after throwing 
bottles at her as she tried to escape, 
tackled her and then kicked and 
stomped her for 30 minutes until she 
died. Loggins stood on Vickie's 
throat until she gurgled blood and 
then exclaimed, "Okay, I'll party." 
They threw Vickie into their truck, 
stripped her naked, and played with 
her lifeless body-at one point 
inserting a beer bottle into her 
vagina. When they had finished, they 
7. Japan: Most People Support the Death Penalty, 
ANSA - Eng. News Service, February 19, 
2005.("More than 80 percent of the Japanese, the 
highest rate ever, are in favour of the death 
penalty, according to a government survey pub-
lished on Saturday"). 
8. See, Most Czechs want capital punishment to 
exist, Czech News Service, November 21, 2003; 
Most Slovaks favor capital punishment ( 61. 7 % ) in Slo-
vakia, CTK, July 25, 2005; 63 percent of respondents 
believe the death penalty should be applied in Mexico, 
Angus Reid Global Scan, August 9, 2005; 6% of 
Russians support death penalty, !tar-Tass, July 5, 
2005. 
9. Poland narrowly rejects return of death penalty, 
Agence France Presse, October 22, 2004 
("According to an opinion poll earlier this year, 
77 percent of Poles support the return of capital 
punishment and 19 percent are against it"). 
threw her body off a cliff. Loggins 
and Duncan returned to the crime 
scene, further mutilating Vickie's 
corpse-stabbing and cutting her 
180 times, removing a portion of one 
lung (one reportedly even bit into 
it), and cutting off her fingers and 
thumbs. Ask the People, "What do 
these two 17-year-olds deserve?" 
Inform other peoples about 
Chrisopher Simmons, Kenneth Log-
gins, Trace Duncan, Mark Anthony 
Duke, and their kind. Remind them 
of the innocent victims-Shirley 
Crook, Vickie Deblieux, Dedra Hunt 
and her two children Chelisa, 6, and 
Chelsea, 7. Let them recall the terror 
and suffering of these innocents and 
the pleasure or callous indifference 
evidenced by these 16- and 17-year-
old sadistic, vicious killers inflicting 
torture. Then give "the world com-
munity" the real choice: Keep these 
monsters alive and in prison-allow 
them to read, watch TV, exercise out-
doors, enjoy snacks, watch movies, 
play basketball and softball. Or con-
demn them to die. And see whether 
the "overwhelming weight of inter-
national opinion" is to let them live. 
After Roper? 
Buoyed by this latest categorical 
restriction, abolitionists can be 
counted on to use their winning 
"logic" to continue their piecemeal 
assault on the death penalty. Now 
that a Court majority has categori-
cally outlawed death as dispropor-
tional for juveniles and the mentally 
retarded, the "mentally ill" are next. 
Pollsters will cooperate to show that 
our standards of decency have 
evolved to the point where the pub-
lic clearly answers "no" when asked, 
"Do you favor executing the men-
tally ill?" Phrased this way, the blan-
ket prohibition has strong appeal. 
Again, however, the question 
obscures moral reality. 
The American Psychiatric Associa-
tion's catalogue of "mental ill-
nesses"-DSM IV-currently classifies 
psychopathy and sexual sadism as 
mental illnesses. A psychopath is gen-
erally intelligent, glib, beats lie detec-
tor tests, and feels little fear, while 
callously indifferent to the extreme 
pain and suffering of others. 
Psychopaths populate our prisons. 
Two especially stand out among hun-
dreds of prisoners interviewed: "Spray 
shooters" who fired machine guns 
into a crowd from a passing van, ran-
domly wounding and killing innocent 
bystanders, including children. Asked 
to consider their innocent victims, 
"S.O.L."-"Shit Outta Luck" one 
declared. "Shouldn't have gotten in 
the way of my bullet," the other, 
shrugged. These cold, callous 
killers-psychopaths-are without 
pity and deserve none. 
And then there are the sadistic 
rapist/murderers like Michael Ross, 
recently executed in Connecticut. 
Ross, who strangled eight women to 
death, raping seven of them first, was 
diagnosed according to the DSM IV 
as suffering from the "mental illness" 
of "sexual sadism." A person who has 
repeated fantasies of causing great 
pain and humiliation to unwilling 
victims sexually, and either acts on 
that fantasy or is troubled by it, 
becomes by definition "mentally ill." 
(Ironically, if he has those fantasies 
but is untroubled by them, according 
to the current definition, he is not 
sick.) Danny Rolling-the Ninja 
killer-would stalk young co-eds, 
break into their apartments, rape 
and mutilate them, and pose their 
bodies pornographically. He, too, 
was a sexual sadist and "mentally ill." 
The point is, for millennia we have 
understood, and the dictionary con-
firms, that the essence of cruelty is 
indifference to, or taking pleasure 
in, another's pain and suffering. At 
the extreme, the psychopaths and 
sadists-the most callous and vicious 
who kill either with a depraved indif-
ference or positive enjoyment at the 
intense suffering they cause-are the 
core of the worst of the worst. Psychi-
atrically they may be "mentally ill;" 
morally they are most evil, and most, 
not least, deserving to die. 
Abolitionists will probably not 
explicitly urge an exemption for psy-
chopaths or sadists. Society generally 
detests them, and justifiably so. But if 
the Court (or legislatures) can be con-
vinced categorically to exempt "the 
mentally ill", once again, these despi-
cable creatures may be shielded 
under the umbrella. 
Administering 
justice after Roper 
These challenges are on the horizon, 
swiftly approaching. But here we are, 
after a U.S. Supreme Court majority 
in Roper has rejected individualized 
justice for juveniles, adopting instead 
a morally obtuse, simplistic solution 
to a difficult problem. Manufactur-
ing consensus, national and world-
wide, they masquerade their policy 
preference as constitutional doc-
trine. Yet, of course, we must obey 
their mandate. In the face of a U.S. 
Supreme Court majority's morally 
indiscriminate but constitutionally 
binding decision, can we still salvage 
a morally appropriate response to 
the worst of the worst, based upon 
individualized justice? 
Forever condemned although not 
to be killed, Mark Anthony Duke 
remains collectively denounced. To 
advance the administration of justice 
after Roper, the people should con-
tinue to condemn him and others like 
him. Each state has the power to spe-
cially punish the once-condemned, 
stripping them of all hope and sub-
jecting them to the harshest prison 
conditions the Constitution allows. 
No good behavior inside can erase 
the past. We must keep our covenant 
with the dead. We owe them, him, 
and ourselves never to forget or for-
give. 
To those who seek death for the 
most heinous killers-notwithstand-
ing the Court's decision but consider-
ing the content of his character and 
the consequences of his choices-
Mark Anthony Duke, forever con-
demned though never to be executed, 
remains "a poster child for us." 4)141 
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